

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

RUFUS TERRY MCDOUGALD, JR.,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-240-WHA-SRW
	)	(WO)
STATMED FAMILY MEDICAL CLINIC,	)	
et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Rufus Terry McDougald, Jr., an indigent inmate incarcerated at the Dale County Jail in Ozark, Alabama, and frequent federal litigant. In this complaint, McDougald challenges the nutritional adequacy of meals provided to him at the jail and seeks thirteen million dollars in damages. Doc. 1 at 3–4.

**II. DISCUSSION**

Upon initiation of this case, McDougald filed a motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Doc. 2. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) directs that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or proceed on appeal *in forma pauperis* if he “has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”<sup>1</sup> Consequently, an inmate in violation of the “three strikes” provision of § 1915(g)

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<sup>1</sup>In *Rivera v. Allin*, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 524 U.S. 978 (1998), the Court held that the “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which requires indigent prisoners who are frequent filers of non-meritorious cases to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their cases and appeals, “does not violate the First Amendment right to access the courts; the separation of judicial and legislative powers; the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law; or the Fourteenth Amendment right

who is not in “imminent danger” of suffering a “serious physical injury” at the time he filed the complaint must pay the filing fee upon initiation of his case. *Dupree v. Palmer*, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002). “The prisoner cannot simply pay the filing fee after being denied *in forma pauperis* status.” *Id.*

The records of this court establish that McDougald, while incarcerated or detained, has on at least three occasions had civil actions dismissed as frivolous, malicious, for failure to state a claim and/or for asserting claims against defendants immune from suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.<sup>2</sup> The cases on which this court relies in finding a § 1915(g) violation by McDougald are as follows: (1) *McDougald v. City of Enterprise Police of Coffee County, et al.*, Civil Action No. 1:16-CV-802-MHT-GMB (M.D. Ala. 2017) (dismissing complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii)); (2) *McDougald v. City of Dothan Police Dept., et al.*, Civil Action No. 1:18-CV-699-WKW-GMB (M.D. Ala. 2018) (dismissing complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-ii)); and (3) *McDougald v. Woodall, et al.*, Civil Action No. 1:18-748-WKW-GMB (M.D. Ala. 2018) (dismissing complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-ii)).

Since McDougald has three strikes, he may not proceed *in forma pauperis* unless the claims raised in the instant complaint demonstrate that he was “under imminent danger of serious physical

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to equal protection, as incorporated through the Fifth Amendment.” The Court further determined that the language of § 1915(g) makes it clear that the “three strikes” provision encompasses cases summarily dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) prior to the effective date of the PLRA and, thus, counting those cases as strikes does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. *Id.* at 728–30; *Medberry v. Butler*, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing *Rivera*, 144 F.3d at 728–30) (holding that cases summarily dismissed prior to the effective date of the PLRA are properly considered strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in determining whether an indigent inmate may proceed without prepayment of the full filing fee). In *Jones v. Bock*, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), the Supreme Court abrogated *Rivera* in limited part, i.e., to the extent it compelled an inmate to plead exhaustion of remedies in his complaint because “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA . . . and inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”

<sup>2</sup>This court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of other federal courts. *Nguyen v. United States*, 556 F.3d 1244, 1259 n.7 (11th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Rey*, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987); *United States v. Glover*, 179 F.3d 1300, 1302 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999)

injury” upon filing this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In determining whether a plaintiff satisfies this burden, “the issue is whether his complaint, as a whole, alleges imminent danger of serious physical injury.” *Brown v. Johnson*, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff must provide the court with specific allegations of present imminent danger indicating that a serious physical injury will result if his claims are not addressed.” *Abdullah v. Migoya*, 955 F. Supp.2d 1300, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2013); *May v. Myers*, 2014 WL 3428930, at \*2 (S.D. Ala. July 15, 2014) (holding that, to meet the exception to application of § 1915(g)’s three strikes bar, the facts in the complaint must show that the plaintiff “was under ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time he filed this action.”); *Lewis v. Sullivan*, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that imminent danger exception to § 1915(g)’s three strikes rule is construed narrowly and available only “for genuine emergencies,” where “time is pressing” and “a threat . . . is real and proximate.”).

The court has carefully reviewed McDougald’s claims regarding his dissatisfaction with the food served at the Dale County Jail. Even construing all allegations in his favor, these claims do not indicate McDougald was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of filing this cause of action as is required to meet the exception allowing circumvention of the directives contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *Medberry*, 185 F.3d at 1193 (holding that a prisoner who has filed three or more frivolous lawsuits or appeals and seeks to proceed *in forma pauperis* must present facts sufficient to demonstrate “imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time he initiates the suit to circumvent application of the “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

Based on the foregoing and on McDougald’s failure to pay the requisite filing upon initiation of this case, the court concludes that this case is due to be summarily dismissed without prejudice. *Dupree*, 284 F.3d at 1236 (emphasis in original) (“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice when [an inmate is not entitled] to proceed

*in forma pauperis* [due] to [violation of] the provisions of § 1915(g)” because the prisoner “must pay the filing fee at the time he *initiates* the suit.”); *Vanderberg v. Donaldson*, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[a]fter the third meritless suit, the prisoner must pay the full filing fee at the time he initiates the suit.”).

### III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* filed by McDougald (Doc. 2) be DENIED.

2. This case be DISMISSED without prejudice for McDougald’s failure to pay the full filing fee upon the initiation of this case.

On or before **May 12, 2020**, the plaintiff may file objections to this Recommendation. The plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections to the Recommendation will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and legal conclusions set forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party from a *de novo* determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal conclusions and shall “waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; *see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.*, 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the magistrate provides such notice and a party still fails to object to the findings of fact [and law] and those findings are adopted by the district court the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest injustice.”); *Henley v. Johnson*, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE, on this the 27<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2020.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker  
Susan Russ Walker  
United States Magistrate Judge